



THINKING FOR TOMORROW

CARBON LIMITS

Practical strategies to avoid over-selling under Article 6

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Outline



Understanding types of over-selling risk



Prioritizing mitigation actions to achieve NDC goals



Practical strategies

- Excluding the 'NDC package'
- Sharing mitigation outcomes
- Creating reserve fund

Strategies for transferring and acquiring counties, but the action takes place in the transferring country



Capacity building and institutional development




Different types of over-selling risk

- Selling low cost mitigation outcomes (MOs) that are necessary for meeting the NDC goal (selling "low hanging fruit")
- Selling MOs that do not represent real reductions (selling "non-existent fruit")
- Selling MOs for which the reduction in emissions will not be captured by the transferring country's GHG inventory (selling "uncounted fruit")
- Selling MOs generated outside the scope of the NDC if the international rules require CAs for these transfers ("trying to sell peaches from an apple farm")

Focus on "low hanging fruit" – other risks addressed in previous papers

Prioritizing mitigation actions to achieve NDC goals





Excluding activities that the country intends to use for NDC achievement from Article 6 cooperation

- Negative list to screen out activities in the NDC package
 - Transparent & quick to implement
 - Relies on NDC mitigation analysis
 - Lists only include technology or project type
- Positive list to use Article 6 for implementing "inaccessible" technologies
 - Transparent
 - Relies on elaborate analysis
 - Interventions excluded for future NDCs
- Abatement cost threshold for Article 6 activities
 - Difficulty of estimating abatement costs
 - Incentivizes project developers to inflate costs
 - Low-cost options only available for NDC (for better or for worse)
- Baselines derived from NDC targets
 - Greater flexibility
 - Feasibility depends on level of detail of NDC targets



Sharing mitigation outcomes generated by cooperative mitigation actions

- Simple division of mitigation outcomes from cooperative activities
 - Transparent and simple
 - Difficulty of choosing the level of sharing
- Limit crediting periods
 - Set at registration of projects
 - Difficulty of identifying the right period
 - Possible bias towards investments with shorter payback times
- Conservative baselines
 - Alternative to using NDC-derived crediting baselines
 - Need assumptions about burden-sharing and equity
- Conditionality on Article 6 transfers
 - Eliminates risk of overselling
 - Eliminates interest from acquiring countries
 - Alternative: only hold back a portion




Article 6 pricing to fund a "reserve" for additional mitigation

- Charging a levy to fund a mitigation outcome reserve or future ITMO purchases
 - Transparency
 - Difficulty of setting the right level of levy
- Explore two-part pricing for ITMOs to reflect opportunity cost
 - Allow mitigation activities from all NDC sectors
 - Higher flexibility to achieve NDC
 - Difficult to assess marginal costs
 - More elaborate negotiations and larger transfer volumes needed

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Exploring two-part pricing to reflect opportunity costs



Source: Authors



| Strategy | Overselling risk reduction | | vern- burden | Transfer volumes |
|---|----------------------------------|------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Negative list for NDC package | | | | |
| Focus on "inaccessible" technologies | | w/ o | r w/o | |
| Abatement cost threshold | | COS | ting | |
| Baselines derived from NDC goals | | | | |
| Simple division of mitigation outcomes | | | | |
| Limit crediting periods | | | | |
| Conservative baselines | | | | |
| Conditionality of transfers | | | | |
| Levy to fund domestic mitigation/future purchases | ? | | | |
| Two-part pricing to reflect opportunity cost | | | | |

| Large | Medium | Small | Zero | Small | Medium | Large |
|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
| positive | positive | positive | impact | negative | negative | negative |
| LP | MP | SP | Z | SN | MN | LN |



| Strategy | | Overselling risk reduction | | vern- burden | Transfer volumes |
|---|--|----------------------------------|-----|-----------------|---------------------|
| Negative list for NDC package | | | | | |
| Focus on "inaccessible" technologies | | | | r w/o | . |
| Abatement cost threshold | | | COS | ting | 2 |
| Baselines derived from NDC goals | | | | | |
| Simple division of mitigation outcomes | | | | | |
| Limit crediting periods | | | | | |
| Conservative baselines | | | | | |
| Conditionality of transfers | | | | | |
| Levy to fund domestic mitigation/future purchases | | ? | | | |
| Two-part pricing to reflect opportunity cost | | | | | |

| Large | Medium | Small | Zero | Small | Medium | Large |
|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
| positive | positive | positive | impact | negative | negative | negative |
| LP | MP | SP | Z | SN | MN | LN |



| Strategy | Overselling risk reduction | | vern- burden | Transfer volumes |
|---|----------------------------------|-----|-----------------|---------------------|
| Negative list for NDC package | | | | |
| Focus on "inaccessible" technologies | 1 | | or w/o | |
| Abatement cost threshold | i i i | COS | ting | 1 |
| Baselines derived from NDC goals | | | | |
| Simple division of mitigation outcomes | | | | |
| Limit crediting periods | | | | |
| Conservative baselines | | | | |
| Conditionality of transfers | | | | |
| Levy to fund domestic mitigation/future purchases | | | | |
| Two-part pricing to reflect opportunity cost | | | | |

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| Strategy | Overselling risk reduction | Govern- ment burden | Transfer volumes |
|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Negative list for NDC package | | | |
| Focus on "inaccessible" technologies | | w/ or w/o | |
| Abatement cost threshold | | costing | |
| Baselines derived from NDC goals | | | |
| Simple division of mitigation outcomes | | | |
| Limit crediting periods | | | |
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| Levy to fund domestic mitigation/future purchases | - ' | | |
| Two-part pricing to reflect opportunity cost | | | |

| Large | Medium | Small | Zero | Small | Medium | Large |
|----------|----------|----------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
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| LP | MP | SP | Z | SN | MN | LN |

Conclusions



Overselling in many forms is a real risk that must be addressed to create thriving international carbon market

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No one strategy will meet all the priorities of transferring and acquiring countries



 \rightarrow Choice(s) depend on each country's NDC pledges, available mitigation options, the data that is available on those mitigation options, and the capacity of government to manage the Article 6 strategy process



Countries without a detailed mitigation analysis would find it difficult to even consider some of the strategies – and face greater risks of overselling – so capacity building and strategy development is critical in the short term